Loss and Damage from the Impacts of Climate Change: A Framework for Implementation by Ohdedar, Birsha
1 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Nordic Journal of International Law 
published by Brill https://doi.org/10.1163/15718107-08501001  
 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/31070/  
 
 
Loss and Damage from the Impacts of Climate Change: A Framework for 
Implementation 
 
Birsha Ohdedar 
 
This is a pre-publication version of: Birsha Ohdedar, ‘Loss and Damage from the 
Impacts of Climate Change: A Framework for Implementation’ (2016) 85(1) Nordic 
Journal of International Law 1, available from: 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/15718107-
08501001 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Loss and damage from the impacts of climate change affect many countries and 
communities across the world. In 2013, the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and 
Damage, created through the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, 
established an institutional process to respond to such impacts. This paper aims to 
contribute to the growing literature on climate liability by outlining a normative 
framework based on international law that can be used as a guiding path for the 
mechanism. It is argued that addressing loss and damage in line with these core 
principles and international law is required to develop a robust and legitimate 
mechanism. This framework is then used to answer critical questions regarding an 
international loss and damage mechanism for climate change. 
1. Introduction 
 
The impacts of climate change are already causing loss and damage to vulnerable 
communities and societies. Over the past twenty years there has been much discussion 
on how we can shift our economies and lifestyles to prevent the damaging impacts of 
climate change. Overall, these discussions have failed to adequately curb emissions 
and the impacts of climate change are now being felt. These impacts include 
ecological harm, floods, droughts, the rise of sea levels, increased frequency of heat 
waves, as well as the human cost of death, disease and displacement.1 There is no 
                                                     
1 M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds), IPCC, 
“Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
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international mechanism responsible for addressing losses from such impacts. Despite 
continued discussion and attempts to adapt to climate change, many communities will 
not be protected from the disastrous impacts of climate change.  
 
In 2013, State Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change2 (henceforth ‘UNFCCC’ or ‘Convention’), agreed to the Warsaw 
International Mechanism (henceforth ‘Warsaw Mechanism’). The Warsaw 
Mechanism is the beginning of a process for further action to address loss and damage 
arising from climate change, something that vulnerable developing countries have 
been advocating for the past 20 years.3  
 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the ethical and legal 
underpinnings of such a loss and damage mechanism and put forward a ‘working 
framework’, based on normative and legal arguments, which can underpin 
discussions. This paper aims to advocate for a loss and damage mechanism with an 
ethical grounding by both justifying a loss and damage mechanism and suggesting 
reforms which seek to improve the international system ultimately bringing it closer 
with what arguably are its core values.  
 
A normative framework, based on international law, is necessary to give the 
mechanism legitimacy. It will provide a legal underpinning to the mechanism, which 
will strengthen the UNFCCC process. Such a framework will provide a clear platform 
for discussions. As UNFCCC negotiations over the last 20 years have shown, 
processes under the treaty can take several iterations and many years of dialogue to 
gain momentum. Therefore, a framework provides overarching goals and parameters 
for a loss and damage mechanism.  
 
The first section of this paper will set out the background to loss and damage, 
including a brief history of how the negotiations around a loss and damage 
                                                                                                                                                        
Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers (Fourth Assessment Report) (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 7-22.  
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 
21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107. (UNFCCC)  
3 See for example AOSIS submission in 1991: AOSIS, Submission to the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (A/AC.237/WG.II/CRP.8, 17 
December 1991). (AOSIS 1991 Proposal) 
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mechanism have evolved. It will then seek to answer two key questions: what is the 
‘justice imperative’ for a loss and damage mechanism at the international level? And, 
is there a basis under international law for such a mechanism? Drawing on these 
discussions, the paper will attempt to set out a coherent framework to create a ‘just 
regime’ to address loss and damage. Finally, keeping this framework in mind, the 
paper will seek to answer some further pertinent questions regarding an international 
loss and damage mechanism.  
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2. What is Loss and Damage? 
 
Defining loss and damage is an on going process; it is more complex than encapsulated in 
one single definition. Loss and damage has been described as impacts which are “beyond 
adaptation”,4 or as “residual damage”.5  
 
The working glossary for loss and damage at regional meetings provides that 
‘damage’ can be thought of as “negative impacts that can be repaired or restored (such as 
windstorm damage to the roof of a building or damage to a coastal mangrove forest from 
coastal surges which affect villages).” 6 ‘Loss’ refers to negative impacts that cannot be 
repaired or restored, such as loss of geological freshwater sources related to glacial melt, 
desertification, and loss of culture or heritage associated with potential population 
redistribution.7 
 
According to Gall and Kreft, what constitutes loss and damage varies and can include 
“economic and non-economic, tangible and intangible, as well as reversible and irreversible 
impacts such as fatalities, destruction of infrastructure, homes, and crops, contamination of 
drinking water, habitat loss, and more.”8 Such damage can be caused by extreme weather 
events or slow onset events. The international community has little experience addressing 
slow onset events in particular.9  
Loss and damage must also be seen in light of temporal and spatial dimensions. It 
reflects the historical and present manifestations of climate change, but also incorporates 
                                                     
4 Bolivia, ‘Theme III – The Role of the Convention in enhancing the implementation of approaches to address 
loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change’, Submission to the UNFCCC, 7 
November 2012, <unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/application/pdf/bolivia_et_al.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2013. 
5 Richard S.J Tol and Roda Verheyen, ‘State Responsibility And Compensation For Climate Change 
Damages—A Legal And Economic Assessment’ (2004) 32 Energy Policy. 
6 UNFCCC, Background paper to the Regional expert meeting on: A range of approaches to address loss and 
damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts related to extreme weather 
events and slow onset processes, 23-25 July 2012, 
<unfccc.int/files/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/loss_and_damage/application/pdf/20120718_fourth_
order_draft_lit_review_unu_ra_lsf.pdf> accessed 1 September 2013.  
7 ibid.  
8 Melanie Gall and Sonke Kreft, ‘Measuring What Matters? A Suitability Analysis of Loss and Damage 
Databases for the Climate Change Convention Process’ (2013) 6 Loss and Damage <www.loss-and-
damage.net/download/6845.pdf> accessed 6 August 2013.  
9 Sonke Kreft, ‘Overview and Summary of Party Submissions on the Role of the Convention’, (2012) 4 Loss 
and Damage <www.lossanddamage.net/download/6868.pdf> accessed August 1, 2013.  
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future potential losses. Currently, loss and damage is largely a local issue, such as the impacts 
described in the case study above. However future loss and damage is of potentially 
unimaginable magnitude due to the interconnectivity of impacts leading to cascading 
transnational events, such as impacts on trade, supply networks, value added chains as well as 
non-economic values, such as climate migration, displacement, and the loss of culture. The 
interconnectivity of impacts and the causes of climate change require a global response to 
address loss and damage.  
2.1 UNFCCC and Loss and Damage 
 
Mechanisms to address loss and damage have been discussed at global climate change 
meetings for more than 20 years, albeit with varying degrees of importance in the agenda. 
The first proposals for a mechanism came back in 1991 from the Alliance of Small Island 
States (henceforth ‘AOSIS’), during the course of negotiations for the UNFCCC (henceforth 
‘1991 AOSIS Proposal’).   
 
The 1991 AOSIS Proposal was significantly forward looking. Verheyen states that the 
proposal would have established quite a flexible and cooperative regime.10 However, at that 
early stage, other State Parties were unwilling to engage in any discussion of liability and 
compensation. This still remains the position of many industrialised countries. However, the 
science is much clearer, and the impacts of climate change are are more present today than in 
1991.  
 
For much of the 1990s and 2000s, mitigation was the dominant topic of discussion on 
climate change. Adaptation, and its corollary loss and damage, were given relatively little 
attention until the mid-2000s. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 made it clear that 
current greenhouse gas (henceforth ‘GHG’) reduction commitments were far too 
conservative, and loss and damage from climate change was inevitable.11 At this stage 
discussions on managing loss and damage re-entered the debate. The 2007 ‘Bali Action 
Plan’12, as well as the agreed Cancun Adaptation Framework13 (henceforth ‘Cancun 
                                                     
10 ibid. 
11 Fourth Assessment Report. 
12 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP13, ‘Bali Action Plan’, (UNFCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008) Article 1(c) 
(ii).  (Bali Action Plan) 
13UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP16, ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention’ (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 
2011) Para 19. (Cancun Agreements) 
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Framework’) started a process of looking into loss and damage again through insurance 
mechanisms and other risk reduction strategies.  
 
At COP 18 in 2012, the issue of loss and damage was debated, and it was agreed that 
institutional arrangements “such as an international mechanism” were to address loss and 
damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change be agreed at COP 19.14  
 
This led to the Warsaw Mechanism, which has set up a framework that can be now 
used by vulnerable developing countries to push for further action on loss and damage. 
Broadly, the Warsaw Mechanism will carry out three types of functions related to:  
1. enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management 
approaches;  
2. strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence, and synergies among relevant 
stakeholders; and  
3. enhancing action and support as to enable countries to take action to address loss and 
damage.  
 
Though many of the perspectives from the international media focussed on the fact 
that there was no compensation or liability mechanism established, it is important to 
recognise that the Warsaw Mechanism further opened the possibility of compensation or 
liability being included in the future. A mechanism needs to develop and operationalise 
before conclusions on its effectiveness can be drawn. Further, such criticism also fails to 
highlight that loss and damage is a complex issue. The Warsaw Mechanism provides a way 
to bring further knowledge and action on a number of issues, such as long term adverse 
effects of climate change, slow onset impacts, loss of livelihood, loss of ecosystems and 
others.  
 
Outside of the Warsaw Mechanism, AOSIS remains the only party to have put 
forward a comprehensive loss and damage proposal.15 In 2008, AOSIS proposed a “Multi-
Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts” to the 
                                                     
14 UNFCCC, Decision 3/CP.18, ‘Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change 
Impacts in Developing Countries that are Particularly Vulnerable to the Adverse Effects of Climate Change to 
Enhance Adaptive Capacity’(UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, 28 February 2013) para 9. 
15 AOSIS 1991 Proposal. 
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Adaptation Working Group (henceforth ‘2008 AOSIS Proposal’).16 Building on the 1991 
AOSIS Proposal, the 2008 AOSIS Proposal has three inter-dependent components: an 
insurance component, a rehabilitation and compensatory competent, and a risk management 
component. The 2008 AOSIS Proposal put forward a proposed adaptation specific fund under 
the UNFCCC17 as the preferable option for funding, as assessed through contributions based 
on the level of countries’ GHG emissions, their respective capabilities, and their historic 
responsibilities. It also suggested other sources of funding, such as bilateral donors and the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The 2008 AOSIS Proposal was put forward before the Cancun Framework and was 
therefore part of a wider mechanism to address adaption. Since 2008, both the adaptation and 
loss and damage programmes have moved forward. However, both the 2008 and 1991 
AOSIS Proposals’ remain extremely helpful blueprints for the development of the Warsaw 
Mechanism.  
  
                                                     
16 AOSIS, Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts (Proposal to 
the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 6 December 2009) 
<unfccc.int/files/Kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/aosisinsurance061208.pdf> accessed 1 August 2013.  
17 Currently such a fund exists under the Kyoto Protocol.  
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3. What is the justice imperative for an International Loss and Damage Mechanism?  
 
Baskin defines climate justice as something beyond and different from the notion of climate 
law, looking at the extent to which our responses to climate change are “fair and 
equitable.” 18 Climate justice is linked to how climate change is associated with broader 
issues of inequalities in wealth and wellbeing and addresses the asymmetries between those 
who are responsible for climate change and those who will bear the burdens of damage 
associated with climate change.19 This paper will specifically look at what theories of climate 
justice can apply in relation to a loss and damage mechanism.  
3.1 Corrective Justice 
 
At a basic level, any system of loss and damage involves correcting the wrong that has 
occurred (climate damage), by providing a remedy for it whether monetarily or by other 
means. Corrective justice is viewed as necessary to equalise a gain by a party who causes an 
injustice and the law, through a judiciary, imposes a penalty to correct the inequality that has 
occurred.20 This concept of corrective justice informs tort law, which is based on a 
foundation of corrective justice and compensating to victims for the damage that tortfeasors 
have caused. For climate change loss and damage, tort law can be seen as an appropriate 
normative framework for addressing damages and is particularly suitable to compensate for 
injury to economic interests related to property rights.21  
 
Corrective justice has already influenced climate policies and measures. Maguire and 
Lewis argue that the Green Climate Fund and the proposed loss and damage mechanism are 
both influenced by theories of corrective justice.22 In relation to loss and damage, the authors 
point out that pooled insurance models, such as that proposed as a component of the 2008 
AOSIS Proposal, primarily seek to ensure that a remedy is provided when harm is suffered, 
thus insurance is based on the influence of corrective justice.23 Corrective justice will 
                                                     
18 Jeremy Baskin, ‘The Impossible Necessity of Climate Justice?’ (2009) 10/2 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law <www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/download887b1.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014.   
19 Neil Adger, Jouni Paavoal and Saleemul Huq, ‘Towards Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change,’ in Neil 
Adger et al. (eds.), Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change (MIT Press, 2006) 4.   
20 W.D Ross, J. L. Ackrill, and J. O. Urmson, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1998) 106.  
21 Philippe Cullet, ‘Liability and Redress for Human-Induced Global Warming – Towards an International 
Regime’ (2007) 43A  Stan.J.Int’l L. 99, 109.  
22 Rowena Maguire and Bridget Lewis, ‘The Influence of Justice Theories on International Climate Policies and 
Measures’ (2012) 8(1) MqJICEL (2012) 16, 26.  
23 ibid. 
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underpin any loss and damage mechanism and requires three elements: a responsible party, a 
victim, and damage.  
3.2 Responsibility and Vulnerability: ‘Who Pays’, ‘Who Claims’, and ‘What Can Be 
Claimed’ 
 
Under any model of corrective justice, those who have caused damage have a duty to 
compensate those who have suffered harm. On the other hand, claimants are generally 
entitled to damages because they are victims of an injustice and the remedy seeks to restore 
victims to the condition that they were in before the unjust activity occurred or provide 
compensation for the harm that has occurred. Thus, an international loss and damage 
mechanism will need to determine who is responsible and who is eligible to claim 
compensation.  
 
Climate change sees a vast disjuncture between those who have been responsible for 
GHG emissions, both historically and currently, and those who continue to suffer most from 
its harmful effects. The unjust distribution of climate change has two sides. First, the physical 
impacts of climate change are felt unevenly across the world. For example, countries such as 
Bangladesh or Tuvalu have very little responsibility for GHG emissions but will face a 
greater impact of sea level rise. Conversely others, such as the United States or parts of 
Western Europe, have contributed far greater in terms of emissions but face less immediate 
threat of impacts.24 Second, many of the countries who are most vulnerable are also 
economically weak and do not have the capacity to deal with the impacts of climate change.  
 
The concept of vulnerability and its linkages with resilience and adaptation are central 
to a loss and damage mechanism. Vulnerability equates to both physical and economic 
insecurity arising from the impacts of climate change.25 In turn, the concept of ‘resilience’, 
which is comes from physical sciences, denotes the ability to anticipate, absorb, 
accommodate or recover from the effects of a hazardous event.26 The impacts of climate 
change will increase vulnerability, however other human and natural systems also contribute 
to greater exposure and vulnerability. The IPCC SREX Report points out that individuals and 
                                                     
24 See for example, climate vulnerability maps on – Center for Global Development, Mapping the Impacts of 
Climate Change <www.cgdev.org/page/mapping-impacts-climate-change> accessed 31 August 2013.  
25 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers,’ in Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 3. (SREX Report) 
26 ibid. 
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communities are differentially exposed and vulnerable based on a range of factors such as 
levels of wealth, education, health status, gender, age and class.27 Factors such as socio-
economic conditions, urbanisation, housing policies as well as physical geography of human 
settlement contribute to exposure and vulnerability and can differ among regions and 
countries.28 Accordingly, vulnerability must be viewed as varying across temporal and spatial 
scales. This complicates pinpointing specific groups that are at highest risk and quantifying 
exact vulnerability.29 Rather, a broad approach under scientific consensus shows which areas 
are likely to experience certain types of climate change and extreme events. These include 
Small Island Developing States (henceforth ‘SIDS’), water scarce and food insecure areas, 
and places with high population densities concentrated in coastal areas.30  
 
Reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience is a key aim of climate change 
adaptation and more generally of disaster management. Climate change adaptation policies 
and a range of other processes (such as economic policies) will play an integral role in 
reducing vulnerability and building resilient societies. Such policies can reduce the need for 
further loss and damage claims. From this perspective, a loss and damage mechanism can be 
viewed as the negative outcome of exposure to environmental hazards and the lack of 
resilience of a community to manage them.31 Loss and damage then serves as an important 
link to evaluate the benchmarks for climate change adaptation and an integral part of 
vulnerability and resilience analyses.32 
 
Under a climate change damages mechanism, Dow, Kasperson, and Bohn argue that 
there is a moral imperative for giving most vulnerable communities special attention.33 This 
position has the philosophical underpinning of John Rawls, who posits that a ‘just society’ is 
one that is arranged in such a way that the position of the least advantaged is optimised.34 It is 
                                                     
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 
29 Kristin Dow, Roger E.  Kasperson, and Maria Bohn, ‘Exploring the Social Justice Implications of Adaptation 
and Vulnerability’, in Neil Adger et al. (eds), Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2006), p. 86. 
30 Dow, Kasperson, and Bohn (n 29) 87. 
31 Andrew Fekete and Patrick Sakdapolrak, ‘Loss and Damage as an Alternative to Resilience and 
Vulnerability? Preliminary Reflections on an Emerging Climate Change Adaptation Discourse’ (2014) 5 Int J 
Disaster Risk Sci 88.  
32 ibid. 
33 Dow, Kasperson, and Bohn (n 29) 85.   
34 See for example: J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).  And 
Pogge’s extension of Rawls to the international scale, see T. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Cornell University Press, 
1989).  
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also reflected in the principle of ‘priority’, under international environmental law. Principle 6 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 (henceforth ‘Rio 
Declaration’) states that priority should be given to the needs of developing countries, 
“particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable.”35 The priority 
principle is also reflected throughout the UNFCCC, which has numerous references to 
prioritising vulnerable nations, namely Least Developed Countries (henceforth ‘LDCs’) and 
SIDS. 
 
The above discussions oblige further questions when examining responsibility and 
vulnerability for nations under a global governance framework. Firstly, how do we create 
subsets of countries that are burdened with responsibility (‘who pays’) and with vulnerability 
(‘who claims’)? Secondly, how do we deal with inequalities that exist within countries? 
Finally, what loss and damage can be claimed in a loss and damage mechanism (‘what can be 
claimed’)?  
 
3.2.1 Defining the Parties 
 
Principles of environmental justice, namely the concepts of ‘polluter-pays’, and ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities’ (henceforth ‘CBDRRC’) can assist in 
defining parties to an international loss and damage mechanism. 
 
The polluter-pays principle is a norm of international environmental law as reflected 
under Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration. The principle simply asserts that the party 
responsible for damage, due to certain polluting activities, pays the cost of damage to the 
natural environment. This principle correlates with corrective justice and tort law’s principle 
of holding a wrongdoer to account. It is also consistent with principles of distributive justice, 
as polluters deserve to have greater responsibilities for the problems they have caused.36  
 
The principle of CBDRRC accords responsibility by accounting the historical 
polluting activities and the economic capabilities of nations. CBDRRC is expressed in 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration and in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. Its philosophical basis 
                                                     
35 UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), 
Annex I, 28 September 1992). (Rio Declaration) 
36 D. Brown, Climate Change Ethics: Navigating the Perfect Moral Storm, (Routledge, 2013) 168.   
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can be traced to two notions of equity. The first notion of equity is the issue of an unequal 
distribution from climate change causing activities. The notion, discussed earlier, that a 
damaging party has benefited disproportionately from the industrialisation process, 
historically reliant on climate change causing activities; yet since the damage is universal, the 
costs are borne by everyone.37 This is linked to the legal principle of ‘common heritage and 
common concern’ that the environment belongs to all of us and needs to be held in trust for 
future generations. The second notion of equity is that countries that face the brunt of the 
damage do not have the capacity to adapt to its impacts or solve the environmental problem. 
Equity in this sense means that the inequalities between nations are taken into account in 
determining levels of commitments between different states.38  
 
Through the concept of polluter-pays and CBDRRC, the climate change regime has 
divided countries into categories of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, or ‘Annex’ and ‘non-
Annex’ to appropriate responsibility. However, CBDRRC has become contentious regarding 
the responsibility and capabilities of large developing countries namely China, Brazil and 
India. These countries have rapidly developed in the last 20 years and their total emissions 
have risen sharply. Accordingly, developed countries have consistently lobbied for greater 
responsibilities to be apportioned to them. The current homogeneity in treating developing 
countries as a large bloc means that China, for example, has the same responsibilities and 
capabilities as Malawi or Palau, despite far greater emissions and less economic 
vulnerability. Furthermore, countries in the South are not homogenous in their interests 
regarding climate change, such as the gulf between SIDS and the petroleum exporting states.  
 
With respect to vulnerability, a tension exists between creating a subset of countries 
able to claim compensation and the ubiquity of vulnerability. This is not to say that all 
countries face the same vulnerability, but rather that all countries are vulnerable to climate 
change. As the Cancun Framework states “adaptation is a challenge faced by all Parties”39 
whether the Parties are wealthy developed countries, large developing countries, LDCs, or 
SIDS. Recent examples of damages, which are attributed to climate change, have been felt by 
a variety of states and peoples. In 2012 and 2013 alone, countries such as India, the United 
                                                     
37 L. Rajamani, ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments 
under the Climate Regime’ (2000) 9(2) RECIEL 120, 123. 
38 ibid. 
39 Cancun Agreements (n 13) para 11.  
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States, and the Marshall Islands were hit by devastating impacts of extreme weather 
attributable to climate change.40  
 
Emphasising the concept of common heritage of mankind for a liability mechanism is 
one way of avoiding state-centric groupings. Taylor argues that a climate liability regime 
should define ‘affected state’ as any state that brings forward an action in the collective 
interest of the ‘global commons’.41 The atmosphere is thus assumed to be part of the global 
commons, and any state can seek compensation, circumventing any ethical uncertainties 
regarding divisions between countries. Taylor suggests a ‘balance of interest’ test for the 
hypothetical tribunal body, with an important flexibility to “take into account particular 
interests of developing states”.42  
 
Other critics argue that a polluter-pays approach, based on historic emissions, is not 
applicable for climate change.43 Cosmopolitan ethicists such as Posner and Sunstien argue 
that holding people responsible for past emissions, which were caused by their dead 
ancestors, or perhaps not even their own ancestors (citing the mobility of citizens through 
countries) is not equitable.44 They argue against state-centric responsibility, suggesting that 
there is a lack of culpability because past emitters were not aware, or did not have scientific 
certainty, over the impacts of their activities. 45 Similarly, Caney argues that individuals, 
corporations, and other economic entities have a burden to share in climate change.46 Caney 
posits a liability regime based on a combination of polluter-pays and CBDRRC, which rests 
on polluters whether they are individuals, corporates, or states. Under Caney's liability 
regime, those who exceed their GHG quotas have a duty to compensate; however the most 
                                                     
40 J. Serna, ‘Hurricane Sandy Death Toll Climbs Above 110, N.Y Hardest Hit’, L.A Times, 3 November  2012, 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/03/nation/la-na-nn-hurricane-sandy-deaths-climb-20121103> accessed 1 
September 2013; ‘Uttarkhand: 5000 feared killed, 19,000 still stranded’, Times of India, 23 June 2013, 
<articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-06-23/india/40146595_1_kedarnath-gaurikund-badrinath> accessed 
1 September 2013; J. Parnell, ‘Tides Swamp Climate Vulnerable Marshall Islands,’ Rtcc.org, 28 June 2013, 
<www.rtcc.org/2013/06/26/tides-swamp-climate-vulnerable-marshall-islands/> accessed 1 September 2013.  
41 Prue Taylor, An Ecological Approach to International Law: Responding to the Challenges of Climate Change 
(Routlege, 1998) 177-180. 
42 ibid 179.   
43 Eric Posner and Carl Sustien, ‘Climate Change Justice’ (2008) 96 Geo.L.J 1565, 1593.  
44 ibid.  
45 ibid 1583-1602.  
46 Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice’ in Stephen Gardiner et al. (eds), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, 
(Oxford University Press, 2010)135-136.  
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advantaged also have a further duty to address the impacts of climate change because they 
have the ‘ability to pay’ rather than responsibility based on historic emissions.47  
 
However, both Taylor’s approach and the cosmopolitan approaches do not consider 
historic emissions. Historic emissions are responsible for much of the damage today and it 
cannot be equitable to simply discount responsibility for such a large contribution to damage. 
Today’s generation living in the global North have benefitted disproportionately from those 
polluting activities. According to the World Resources Institute, the Untied States, Europe, 
and the former Soviet Union are responsible for around 70 per cent of all CO2 emissions in 
the 20th century.48 Moral culpability is also justified. Since the 1990s, there has been 
scientific consensus on the effects of GHG emissions, yet there has been no slow down in 
emissions by those countries that are the largest polluters.49 Accordingly, moral culpability 
can be justified and, as Brown states, “at a minimum, be calculated for the point in time that 
nations should have known that emitting greenhouse gases could cause climate change 
harms.”50 
 
A response to climate change and loss and damage must consider the unique spatial 
and temporal characteristics of the issue. Therefore, a loss and damage mechanism must 
consider historic, current, and future contributions to GHG emissions. The polluter-pays 
principle demands responsibility to be accorded in such a way to account for new polluters. 
Historic responsibility needs to be weighed against the economic capability of countries to 
have reduced emissions since scientific consensus. Differentiation therefore needs to move 
from static to dynamic groups to reflect the changes in the world in both responsibility and 
capabilities.51  
 
Alternative approaches to apportioning responsibility have been discussed under the 
UNFCCC. In 1997 Brazil made a proposal to equitably share the burden for mitigation, 
                                                     
47 ibid.  
48 World Resources Institute, Contributions to Global Warming: 1900-1999, March 20 2008, 
<www.wri.org/map/contributions-to-global-warming>  accessed 29 August 2013.  
49 Brown (n 36)193.  
50 ibid.  
51 These changes have now resulted in a more dynamic discussion about differentiation since the process of 
developing a new agreement in 2015. See for example the discussion in ‘Summary of the Roundtable under 
Work stream 1, ADP1, part 2, Doha, Qatar, November-December 2012’, Ad-Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Note by Co-Chairs (7 February 2013), 3, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/adp1/eng/6infsum.pdf (accessed 1 May 2014)  
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amongst developed countries, accounting for past contributions to global warming 
(henceforth ‘Brazilian Proposal’).52 Emissions targets were based on historical responsibility, 
because a current emissions figure by a country did not reflect its ‘actual’ contribution to 
global warming. Similarly, a ‘contraction and convergence’ (henceforth ‘C&C’) framework 
has been discussed whereby total global emissions reduced to meet a specific target, and the 
per capita emissions of industrialised and developing countries converge over a period of 
time, at an agreed rate and magnitude of contraction and convergence.53 C&C applies 
principles of precaution and equity, principles identified as important in the UNFCCC but not 
defined. The C&C approach has been used in many national climate change frameworks and 
could provide a basis for a future agreement. It provides for a flexible mechanism taking into 
account the increased emissions by certain developing countries. The principles behind this 
approach provide a framework, which is appropriately aware of the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of climate change. Further, it could be used to determine contribution to a future 
loss and damage fund.   
 
Similarly, to apportion vulnerability we can draw upon the principles of historic 
polluter-pays, ability to pay, and priority. Despite the ubiquity of the impacts of climate 
change, overall vulnerability shows a geographical division between developed and 
developing states. On the question of large developing countries the approach necessary 
could look at both their physical vulnerability and economic ability to determine a claim. 
According to these two indices, a weighted system could incorporate their vulnerability in an 
approach consistent to the needs of distributive justice. 
3.2.2 Distributional Justice Within States 
 
Relatedly, inequality within countries obscures the lines between ‘North’ and ‘South’ or 
‘Annex’ and ‘non-Annex’. Take the case of India, a large developing country, very low in 
human development according to indices such as the Human Development Index and other 
development indicators. However, a report by Greenpeace India, Hiding Behind the Poor, 
highlights that the wealthy and middle classes of Indian society are consuming and emitting 
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at the same levels as those in developed countries.54 Thus, the high emitting wealthy and 
middle classes in India are able to essentially “hide behind the poor” with respect to 
international negotiations around climate change burdens.55 The report emphasises the extent 
to which emissions disparities exist between the rich and poor in developing countries.  
 
In a quantitative analysis on climate justice, Baer creates a model of responsibility for 
climate change based on vulnerability and responsibility.56 Controversially, and 
conservatively, he weighs ‘vulnerability’ as equal for individuals in every country, regardless 
of wealth.57 His statistical analysis still concludes that a burden exists upon ‘Annex’ or 
‘developed’ countries to compensate. This is important, because it gives credibility to the 
current division under the UNFCCC, even from a conservative analysis. Baer goes further 
looking at income inequality, emissions, and responsibility inside countries. He concludes, 
“The underlying principles of responsibility that are relevant for GHG liability are not based 
on nations except as a matter of pragmatism. The same distribution principles that apply 
between nations should apply within nations, with increased liability for those that are more 
responsible.”58 
 
Though climate change is inter alia a class and distribution issue, whether the 
international stage can adequately respond to it is a difficult question and may detract or 
politicise negotiations too far from the main aim of the UNFCCC, the stabilisation of 
greenhouse gases. However, as a secondary feature, a loss and damage mechanism could at a 
minimum, recognise inequality inside states by incorporating principles and declarations 
urging that countries tackle issues of liability and responsibility within their jurisdiction. 
Efforts to ensure funds are allocated to those most vulnerable and liability is allocated to 
those individuals, classes, and communities who are most responsible are required.59 Section 
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3, discusses a range of liability regimes; such approaches could be used to internalise the 
costs of responsibility in the national context.  
 
3.2.3 Defining the Damage 
 
A key issue for a loss and damage mechanism is setting parameters for the damages that can 
qualify. As knowledge of loss and damage is an on-going process, it would be imperative to 
create a dynamic process of defining damages. In this respect, it is important to balance 
strong definitions to give claimants certainty, with flexibility to refine and benchmarks in line 
with growing scientific knowledge of loss and damage.60 At a conceptual level, the link 
between vulnerability and damages must be central to this exercise. The key area of difficulty 
will be capturing slow-onset events and non-economic vulnerability. Whereas pooled 
insurance-based mechanism could play a vital role in sudden onset events, it is less well 
equipped to deal with slow onset event, which require a much broader understanding of 
damages.61  
 
In light of the difficulties in defining parameters of damage, Burkett proposes using 
the United Nations Compensation Commission (“UNCC”) as a blue print to resolve climate-
related claims.62 In the aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait war, the UNCC was set up as a 
compensation and transitional justice mechanism. The UNCC included claims for 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources. Importantly, the UNCC 
facilitated claims for environmental damage that went beyond property damage, as well as 
including “other environmental damage” which included recovery for permanent damage for 
which restoration was infeasible.63 This provides a precedent for the international community 
as a mechanism for a broader, more holistic, definition of damage. Given the need for a 
dynamic process, a technical arm of a loss and damage mechanism would be ideally placed to 
drive this process. It would also be linked to the threshold of causation, which is discussed in 
more detail in section 4.2. 
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3.3 Transitional Justice 
 
Related to corrective justice, transitional justice is an evolving area of international law 
whose principles could be used by the climate regime for finding solutions to loss and 
damage. Transitional justice refers to processes and mechanisms used in countries and 
societies that are making transitions from violent conflict or large-scale human rights 
abuses.64 As such, it is usually understood as a set of mechanisms for achieving justice in 
periods of change, rather than a substantive concept of justice in its own right.65 However, its 
models and ethos are useful in trying to frame a just mechanism to address loss and damage.  
 
Reparation actions are a form of transitional justice. The UNCC, discussed above, is 
an example of reparation actions for environmental harms. The ethos of reparations is based 
on legal principles that require perpetrators to return wronged individuals to the status quo 
ante, or if not, possibly compensate victims for their injuries.66 Importantly, they are both 
backward and forward looking in nature. Reparations seek to identify and compensate for an 
exact past harm. Yet, they are forward-looking in that they recognise that the past harm can 
have a current and continuing effect. Rather than an exact calculation of monetary payment 
based on those current harms, reparations seek to improve lives into the future.67 
 
Scholars have recently proposed mechanisms to widen transitional justice 
mechanisms. Blum and Lockwood argue that there is no moral or ethical reason why 
reparations cannot be expanded to compensate victims of natural disasters and other causes of 
human suffering. 68 The unique moral and scale issues of climate change demand strategies 
which are ‘outside the box’. Transitional justice has often been an area of law that has had the 
flexibility of adopting new institutional mechanisms outside of traditional legal structures. 
Jamieson points out that climate change discussions often lack the voice of morality, 
specifically care, empathy, responsibility, and duty; rather, they focus more on science, 
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economics, and technology.69 Transitional justice has often been more normative, holistic, 
and forward looking. Given its ethos, it could provide the comprehensive approach necessary 
to address the injustice faced by the climate vulnerable.70  
 
Transitional justice also posits that to centre the moral claim, an admission of liability 
and responsibility is an important part of the process. One cannot expect admission to come 
easily. However, the allocation of responsibility and liability in the climate regime itself 
would go a long way in centring the moral claim. As a corollary to admission, transitional 
justice often bases its processes on bringing out the voices of victims. For climate change loss 
and damage, the inclusion of civil society is a vital part of this process. Value should be given 
not only to NGOs, but also collectives and unions directly representing the voices of 
vulnerable groups. Hearing the impacts of climate change upon farmers, peasants, indigenous 
people, women and other extremely vulnerable and marginalised groups are examples of this 
process. This would further justice and legitimacy in addressing the impacts of loss and 
damage.  
3.4 Summary  
 
To recap, there is an ethical imperative for an international loss and damage mechanism, 
based on the concept of corrective justice. Environmental justice principles assist in obliging 
historically polluting countries to hold principal responsibility for contributing to 
compensation. However, current and future emissions need to be taken into account when 
apportioning responsibility. Any claim to vulnerability must address historic and current 
emissions, as well as actual physical vulnerability and economic ‘ability to pay’ (for costs of 
adaptation or addressing damage). It has been argued that a state-centric approach must be 
maintained for pragmatic reasons and that inequalities inside states need to be emphasised by 
an international mechanism. Defining loss and damage is an on-going process, however at a 
minimum it must link to vulnerability and include a broader definition of damage to ensure 
that the complexities of climate impacts are captured.  Furthermore, transitional justice 
frameworks are useful models to deal with the gravity of climate change issues and centring 
the voice of morality, in addition to being both backward and forward looking in assisting 
parties to move past the harm that has occurred. 
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4. The Legal Underpinning of a Loss and Damage Mechanism 
 
Legal parameters are important in ascertaining who is responsible for climate change 
damages, when such responsibility can be attributed, and how burden sharing 
operates. Recent scholarship has pointed out that there is a prima facie case for 
vulnerable countries to bring a legal claim against developed and industrialised 
countries for climate change damages.71 In 2011, Palau announced plans to seek an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) on the obligations and 
responsibilities of states under international law to avoid transboundary harm caused 
by GHG emissions.72 Although an advisory opinion would be non-binding, it would 
mark a potential turning point for the climate regime and formally define states’ 
obligations and responsibilities with respect to emissions under international law. 
 
An international loss and damage mechanism will be a political decision, 
rather than a judicial one regarding compensation. As the Warsaw Mechanism is 
through the UNFCCC then the principles of international law are still vital in creating 
a consistent and coherent mechanism. This consistency would also be in line with the 
2012 ‘Declaration on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’, 
adopted by the General Assembly, which reaffirmed a commitment of the 
international community to the international rule of law as a way to respond to 
challenges of collective concern.73  
4.1 Who Has to Pay: The Law of State Responsibility 
 
Establishing legal responsibility is both important in holding states liable for climate 
change damage and as a legal precursor to a loss and damage mechanism. Without 
legal responsibility or liability, it is difficult to hold states to account and develop a 
strong regime. As will be discussed later, one of the key issues with funding is that 
liability has never been established for climate change.  
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The law of state responsibility is primarily governed through the International 
Law Commission’s (henceforth ‘ILC’) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (henceforth ‘DASR’).  The DASR do not create law; 
however, they are a codified restatement of the existing law of state responsibility.74 
Under Article 1 of the DASR, state responsibility for an action is triggered when there 
is a breach of an international legal obligation. Such an obligation can be established 
by treaty, by a rule of customary international law, or under general principles of 
international law.75  
 
The DASR is not specific to environmental damage. As such there are no 
specific environmental treaties or standards that establish a threshold for 
environmental damage that triggers liability and allows for claims to be brought.76 
The need for effective liability and state responsibility for environmental damage is 
stressed by soft law instruments.77 International case law, state practice, and legal 
scholarship have seen the slow development of the law of state responsibility for 
environmental damage.78  
 
Legal consequences arise when an internationally wrongful act has been 
committed. The general system to establish state responsibility under the DASR can 
be summarised as follows:  
i. There is a breach of an international obligation;  
ii. The breach is attributable to a State;  
iii. Once the breach is established, another Sate can demand cessation of the 
wrongful act (re-instatement of lawful behaviour and/or reparation, including 
compensation if there is injury).  
 
These criteria to test the law of state responsibility are now considered in 
greater depth with reference to climate change loss and damage.  
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4.1.1 Has an international obligation been breached? 
 
Under Article 12 of the DASR, a State commits a wrongful act when its conduct does 
not conform with an international obligation.79 State responsibility under the DASR 
only applies when there is a breach of an international obligation under treaty or 
custom.  
4.1.2 Treaty Law 
 
The UNFCCC is the primary treaty regulating GHG emissions and is the source of 
inquiry into an obligation, which can invoke state responsibility.80 In general, the 
UNFCCC has tried to avoid the question of state responsibility, liability, and damage. 
This is consistent with broader environmental law, where states have been reluctant to 
use the mechanism of state responsibility to address the consequences of 
environmental damage and reflects an unwillingness to agree to something that may 
eventually find them liable.81 In response, some states have made a declaration that 
signing the Convention was not renunciation rights under international law 
concerning responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change.82 
 
Article 2 of the UNFCCC states the ultimate objective of the Convention is the 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The 
article assumes that humans interfere with the climate system and recognises that 
human activity impacts GHG concentrations. The preamble of the Convention gives 
further context to this objective noting historical and current emissions levels by 
countries.83 Voigt argues that a ‘duty of prevention’ exists under Article 2 for Parties 
to stabilise emissions.84 Though the provision identifies the overall objective, Article 
2 is part of an international treaty and therefore must be analysed in the context of 
international law, rather than simply a political declaration. Under the Vienna 
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Convention of the Law of Treaties85 (“VCLT”), Article 2 must be given its ordinary 
meaning (Article 31.1 VCLT), that there is an obligation to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In addition, Parties must refrain 
from acts that would defeat the purpose of the treaty (Article 18 VCLT).86 The 
Principles of the UNFCCC under Article 3 reaffirm an emphasis to prevent damage 
and highlights the precautionary principle of international environmental law that the 
“lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures.”87  
 
Under Article 4.2 of the Convention, Annex I Parties commit themselves to 
adopting national policies and implementing corresponding measures towards the 
mitigation of climate change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of GHGs and 
protecting sinks. As Article 4.2 was heavily debated in the Convention’s negotiations, 
it led to a weak provision. Bodansky has stated that Article 4.2 is “highly ambiguous” 
and “heavily qualified”, making it questionable whether the Convention creates a 
legally binding target at all.88 The ‘Berlin Mandate’ reaffirmed the weakness of this 
provision and lead to the Kyoto Protocol89, which set more robust targets and 
timetables.90 But despite its weaknesses at putting forward a quantifiable, legally 
binding target, Article 4.2 can be interpreted in light of Article 18 of the VCLT as 
putting forward an ‘obligation of conduct’ to reverse ever increasing GHG 
emissions.91  
 
These relatively modest provisions render it difficult to establish an 
enforceable duty on states to reduce GHG emissions. Some legal scholars have argued 
that there are enforceable minimum obligations under the Convention. Voigt argues 
that Article 2 and 4.2 place duties on Annex I Parties to, at a minimum, not defeat the 
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objective, consistent with Article 31 of the VCLT.92 Hence, a State Party could be 
breaching the Convention if it has continued to increase emissions since the 
ratification of the UNFCCC at rates that may lead to dangerous climate change. 
Further, Voigt states that adaptation funding is not voluntary, but a “substantive 
obligation on all Parties with a view to reducing future climate change damage.”93 Tol 
and Verheyen argue that countries that do not meet Kyoto Protocol targets could be 
responsible, as they would be breaching international law.94 In addition, Verheyen has 
argued that Annex I countries that do not make ‘real efforts’ to meet these targets 
breach both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.95 By ‘real efforts’ she refers to 
compliance with co-operation duties, finding adequate regulatory solutions to reach 
the objective of the UNFCCC, and enacting suitable legislation based on scientific 
findings of absolute emissions levels.96  
 
Overall, state responsibility for climate change damages based on treaty law, 
through the UNFCCC, remains uncertain given the relatively weak obligations under 
the Convention. Though it is not impossible to conceive of a breach under the 
UNFCCC, it remains a controversial topic without much consensus.   
4.1.3 Customary International Law 
 
A breach of an obligation under customary international law can also trigger state 
responsibility.97 The no-harm rule is a widely recognised principle of customary 
international law and is applicable in the context of climate change. Under the no-
harm rule, states have an obligation to not damage the environment of other states and 
areas beyond its jurisdiction.98 The basis for this rule is found through case law, state 
practice, and other legal instruments.  
 
The legal precedent for the no-harm rule stems from the Trail Smelters case, 
where a Canadian smelter’s emissions had caused air pollution damage across the 
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border into the United States.99 The no-harm principle is codified under Principle 21 
of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, where all states 
have the “responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction”. The Convention on Biological Diversity (henceforth ‘CBD’) 
(Article 3) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (henceforth 
‘UNCLOS’) (Article 194, para 2) and other international texts include the no-harm 
rule.100 Additionally, the rule has been given authority by the ICJ in advisory opinions 
and judgements.101 In the context of climate change, the no-harm rule is importantly 
referred to in Recital 8 of the UNFCCC preamble.102  
 
No threshold for harm as such has been agreed upon for the environment to 
trigger a liability claim. Whilst all pollution or human activity having adverse effects 
might give rise to environmental damage, it is unlikely that all environmental damage 
results in state liability.103 State practice and international legal instruments have 
indicated that ‘significant’ damage must have occurred before the no-harm principle 
has been breached and state responsibility can be invoked. In Trail Smelters, it was 
held that a ‘serious consequence’ was necessary. Similarly, the 2001 ILC Draft 
Principles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm seeks to prevent ‘significant’ 
harm.104 In the commentary to the 2001 Draft Principles, the ILC observed that 
‘significant’ can be defined as “something more than detectable but not at the level of 
serious or substantial”.105 Thus, not all types of damage must be prevented, but a de 
minimis threshold exists for transboundary environmental damage.106 
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The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report is fairly clear that the impacts of climate 
change will result in significant damages to the environment, human health, and 
property. Therefore, climate change injuries and damages are meeting, at least, a de 
minimis threshold required for a breach of the no-harm rule. Under international law, 
if a state is found to violate international legal principles such as the no-harm rule, 
then it is obliged to compensate affected states for the damage caused, either directly 
or indirectly.107  
4.2 Can responsibility be attributable to the state?  
 
State responsibility for climate change damages requires that state behaviour can be 
identified or that the actions of private persons can be attributed to the state.108 As a 
large proportion of emissions are by private corporations and citizens rather than the 
state itself, the concept of ‘due diligence’, as a standard of care for government 
authorities can be applied to invoke state responsibility for climate change 
damages.109 Due diligence, under international law, is said to comprise at least the 
following elements110:  
i. Opportunity to act or prevent;  
ii. Foreseeability or knowledge that a certain activity could lead to transboundary 
damage; and  
iii. Proportionality in the choice of measures required to prevent harm or to 
minimise risk.  
 
 The ILC has noted that acting with due diligence requires a state to 
formulate policies designed to prevent “significant transboundary harm” or to 
“minimize the risk thereof” and implement these policies.111 Therefore, a state may be 
liable for resulting harm if, despite such foreseeability, proportionate policy measure 
were not taken and significant harm was caused.  
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 In real terms, the link between GHG emissions and the potential impacts of 
climate change have been known since at least the early 1990s when the UNFCCC 
was negotiated.  According to Voigt, acting with due diligence requires states to keep 
abreast with scientific development and take effective mitigation measures based on 
the best available technologies.112 It also requires states to substantially reduce GHG 
emissions, effectively obliging a State to “do the best it can in reducing the risks that 
result from climate change”.113 At a minimum, developed countries, as those with the 
opportunity to act and the highest emissions, have an obligation to limit emissions – 
as a proportionate response - even if this was at the expense of economic growth. 
However, despite opportunities and foreseeability, mitigation action has been 
inadequate.  
 
For a state to be responsible for a breach of an international obligation, there 
also needs to be a causal nexus between the actions of a state and damage. Climate 
change presents a variety of impacts caused by a variety of actors and a variety of 
actions. By its nature it is impossible to attribute emissions of a specific country to 
specific damage. 114 This presents a difficulty to reconcile with traditional ‘but-for’ or 
‘specific causation’ that requires proof that a specific activity links directly to a 
particular injury. However alternative theories of causation, or a combination of 
theories opens up a possibility to optimise fairness for parties.  Tol and Verheyen 
have posited that general causation can be used as a basis for climate change 
damages. 115 General causation refers to a causal link between an activity and the 
general outcome. In this case, a proof that GHG emissions lead to climate change, 
which then leads to impacts on ecosystems, such as air temperature rises, sea level 
rises and so on.116 Duffy, has advocated for a probabilistic causation test, where a 
claimant brings scientific evidence of cause of damage and the evidence is allowed to 
stand even if it shows less than 50% contribution to the risk of harm (a limitation 
under traditional causation tests). 117 The evidence is then assessed according to 
whether it is more likely than not accurate and liability is apportioned linking to the 
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percentage by which anthropogenic influences contributes to the risk of harm and 
divided based on share of greenhouse gases.118 There are many policy reasons for 
allowing such alternative, expanded, or hybrid tests of causation, but most notable 
that the victim should not be left without a remedy just because multiple causes or 
defendants cause harm.119 Such tests are often used in complex torts cases, involving 
multiple defendants or multiple causes.120  
 
Indeed, concern about not being able to use traditional specific causation has 
been used by countries to argue against an international loss and damage 
mechanism.121 However, international law does not specify any formula for 
determining causation and thus tests of causation that are more suitable from a justice 
point of view, such as a general causation test, can be used. There is almost universal 
international scientific consensus today that anthropogenic emissions of GHGs have 
caused changes in the radiative forcing balance in the atmosphere causing climate 
change.122 The IPCC has predicted that regional changes in temperatures have already 
significantly affected many physical and biological systems.123 Furthermore, a loss 
and damage mechanism at the international level, though based on principles of 
international law, is not as tightly constrained by the judicial limitations of climate 
change litigation and case law. General causation (or other hybrid tests of causation) 
provides a legal underpinning to attribute climate damages upon states.  
 
In section 2, equitable burden-sharing options for responsibility were 
discussed. Attribution could be apportioned under burden-sharing mechanisms using 
the principles of international environmental law such as historic polluter-pays and 
CBDRRC.124 
4.3 An international liability mechanism 
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The above discussions have illustrated that state responsibility is applicable for 
climate change loss and damage. Under Article 31 DASR, there is a duty to make 
“full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”. Under 
Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration, States should “cooperate in an expeditious and 
more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and 
compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage”.  
 
As previously discussed, the UNFCCC does not mention liability or state 
responsibility, which continues to remain a regulatory gap in the regime. Positivist 
legal theory, such as the works of Austin and Kelsen, holds that sanctions are a key 
element to legal rules. 125 As Cullet states, “without liability and redress or state 
responsibility rules, the climate change regime will remain largely ineffective from 
the point of view of people and countries suffering from its on-going impacts.”126 
However, environmental law does provide for liability in other sectors, which can 
provide models and lessons for a loss and damage mechanism. 
 
Existing environmental liability mechanisms fall into two broad categories: 
state liability and civil liability. The former is liability found under international law 
and imposes liability on the state for ensuing damage. The rules of state liability for 
environmental damage remain fairly underdeveloped and addressed only by a small 
number of treaties.127 One example is the Space Liability Convention in 1972, which 
introduces a clear rule of state liability for damage from State Parties carrying out 
space programmes.128 However, one of the major issues for state liability mechanisms 
for environmental damage is that states are reluctant to put in place rules regarding 
state liability or foster principles that might be applied against them.129 
 
More common are liability regimes, which impose civil liability on third party 
private and public actors for environmental damage.130  Some of these include the 
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Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,131 the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal132, and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 1992133 (henceforth ‘CLC’). 
 
Despite the variety of subject matter, most civil liability regimes follow 
similar models. This includes defining the activities covered and what damage entails, 
channelling liability, establishing a standard of care, providing liability amounts, 
allowing exonerations, requiring adequate financial security, and identifying a 
tribunal or court to hear claims.134 Much of this framework can be drawn upon for a 
climate change loss and damage mechanism. However, it is worth expanding on three 
important issues, namely defining damage (which in turn affects what is 
compensated), funding liability regimes, and measuring compensation.  
 
Some treaties, such as UNCLOS, do not define damage nor establish a 
measure of compensation. Rather a number of articles in UNCLOS guide the 
discussion. Additionally UNCLOS benefit from a tribunal type forum for claims to be 
defined and measured.135 Damage in the Space Liability Convention focuses on 
human health and loss or damage to property.136 Sands and Peel argue that although 
the definition does not refer to environmental harm, it can be interpreted to allow 
compensation for claims for the ‘property of states’ that are environmental assets or 
other natural resources.137 Civil liability regimes, such as the CLC, focus on 
‘pollution damage’ defined as ‘loss or damage’ caused outside the ship through 
‘contamination’.138  
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The Lugano Convention is one exception to most civil liability regimes as it is 
ambitious in expanding the reach of liability from sectoral to regional.139 The overall 
objective is to ensure adequate compensation for damage resulting from activities 
dangerous to the environment and also includes the costs of preventative measures 
and any loss or damage caused by preventive measures.140 However, the Lugano 
Convention’s political feasibility is uncertain, as it has not been ratified by any State 
Parties and it is doubtful whether it ever enters into force.  
 
The CLC provides a good example of a funding mechanism with pool 
funding. Under the CLC, liability is established for the owner of a ship for pollution 
damage, or ‘loss or damage outside a ship carrying oil by contamination’.141 The 
regime operates under strict liability, and there are caps to liability depending on guilt 
of parties. Attached to the CLC is the 1992 Fund Convention, which establishes an 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (henceforth ‘IOPC Fund’); the IOPC 
provides compensation for pollution damage that is inadequately compensated 
through the CLC.142 Annual contributions are made into the IOPC Fund by each party 
carrying above a certain level of oil into ports.  
 
This type of fund and liability mechanism acts as a form of ‘pre-disaster risk 
hedging’ purchased by each state.143 Participation in the regime by a state reduces 
uncertainty (risk), which might otherwise be the case. It prevents states from having 
to act as unwilling insurers of their own and their citizens’ losses. This is particularly 
relevant when adequate compensation cannot be obtained from responsible parties, 
either because operator liabilities have caused bankruptcy or causation cannot be 
determined.144 It also implements the polluter-pays principle, by shifting the costs of 
harm directly on to the person or entity most responsible for the activity causing 
damage. Only if operator liability is insufficient does a mechanism for a state or a 
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global collective loss sharing arrangement apply to address uncompensated 
damage.145  
 
Though much can be drawn upon from existing liability regimes, applying the 
frameworks of current environmental liability regimes to climate change does have 
certain shortcomings and challenges.  
 
First, liability mechanisms existing today are mainly for acts of pollution or 
injury to property caused by accidents. Damage from the impacts of anthropogenic 
climate change are caused by conduct, which is ‘normal’, though cumulatively cause 
negative environmental effects. This is not only conceptually different, but in 
practical terms, there is no one particular operator’s conduct that can be blamed (the 
problem of attribution). However, attribution should not be an impediment, as 
flexibility under a pooled or joint liability systems could provide an answer. Pool-
funding mechanisms are particularly useful to apportion responsibility adequately and 
draw funds from a large number of parties. Further, normal activity of GHG 
emissions over a certain point could be used as signalling liability. Alternatively, as 
the 1991 AOSIS Proposal put forward, if sea levels reach a certain threshold, some 
form of responsibly is invoked for a certain group of countries and any pooled fund 
then pays compensation for damage. 146 
 
Second, defining damage is more complex in a climate change context. 
Current environmental liability regimes, with the exception the Lugano Convention, 
are fairly restricted in scope. Definitions of damage are limited to environmental 
damage or direct property damage from contamination. However, climate change 
poses unique difficulties, such as slow-onset changes and damages beyond 
environmental and property damage. It is important to realise a definition of loss and 
damage, which is both inclusive and politically feasible. This will undoubtedly be one 
of the most difficult tasks for the UNFCCC bodies and State Parties. 
 
Finally, current environmental liability regimes offer ex-post damages that can 
be quantified through existing mechanisms of measuring loss and damage. Ex-post 
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responses, though beneficial after a major disaster, have a disadvantage in that they do 
not prevent fatalities or damage and could also be fairly cumbersome to respond to 
damages. Ex-ante measures, such as insurance, have the advantage of being relatively 
fast and reliable, with payouts to beneficiaries being fairly certain.147 Neither ex-ante 
nor ex-post mechanisms can fully respond to the multitude or risks that climate 
change damages entails. A proposal put forward by AOSIS in 2008 for instance has 
proposed a dual nature alternative (with compensation and insurance pillars) to try an 
overcome this. 
 
4.4 Summary  
 
The ethical positions discussed in section 2 are supported by international law, 
through the law of state responsibility, which invokes liability where there has been a 
breach of an international obligation. Though there are significant gaps in invoking 
state responsibility through a breach of a treaty provision, there is a stronger legal 
imperative through a breach of the no-harm rule under customary international law. 
By invoking alternative or hybrid tests of causation and due diligence, attribution can 
be apportioned to State Parties.  
 
Liability mechanisms have at least a political imperative under international 
environmental law. Existing liability regimes are largely sector specific and deal with 
climate change inadequately. This issue remains a large regulatory gap in the climate 
change regime and are an imperative to a working loss and damage mechanism. 
Existing liability regimes, such as those for oil pollution, can be used more generally 
to show that ‘pooled funds’ and international liability mechanisms, in general, do 
have working precedents. Existing regimes also provide a general framework for use; 
yet, they need to incorporate the unique characteristics of climate change, such as 
slow onset events, and work with risk management mechanisms (insurance)
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5. A framework for implementation  
 
In light of the discussions in section 2 and 3, the following framework is suggested to 
create a ‘just regime’ to address loss and damage. That an international loss and 
damage mechanism: 
 
i. Defines and delineates ‘responsible parties’, and ‘victims’; 
ii. Prioritises the needs of the ‘most vulnerable’ and is inclusive to the voices of the 
most vulnerable; 
iii. Operates as a pool fund to ensure contributions which signify the common 
responsibility of nations;  
iv. Ensures flexibility in a definition of ‘damage’, which incorporates the property, 
the environmental, and the human costs of damage;  
v. Considers prior historic emissions, as well as current and future emissions;  
vi. Emphasises a transitional justice ethos of recognition of responsibility, as well as 
centring the moral question of loss and damage; and 
vii. Works effectively with other policy to mitigate greenhouse gases and promote 
sustainable development.  
 
 This framework will now be used to closely analyse the UNFCCC and see 
whether the UNFCCC is able to provide for a loss and damage mechanism, as well as 
suggesting ‘ways forward’. Three pertinent questions are discussed below.  
 
1. Does the UNFCCC effectively identify parties to damage claims and govern  
2. How is finance and funding dealt with under the UNFCCC? 
3. Does the UNFCCC adequately centre moral questions of loss and damage? 
 
5.1 Identifying Parties and Governing a Mechanism 
 
The preceding sections have shown that a loss and damage mechanism would have to 
clearly identify parties who are responsible for damage and those who are victims or 
potential claimants for compensation. There is an ethical imperative to compensate 
those who are most vulnerable and a legal imperative under customary international 
law to compensate those who are harmed.  
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Arguably, the UNFCCC identifies both responsible parties and vulnerable 
parties, without directly applying a corrective justice or liability framework. Article 
4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 put forward obligations on Annex II Parties to finance and support 
developing country adaptation measures. Under Article 4.4 developed countries are to 
assist developing countries in coping with the adverse effects of climate change. 
Sands and Peel state that Article 4.4 represents an “implicit acceptance” by developed 
country parties of responsibility for causing climate change.148  
 
Articles 4.8 and 4.9 contain commitments applicable to all Parties to give 
special consideration to particular groups of developing country Parties. Under Article 
4.8, nine groups and types of countries are listed that must be specifically accounted 
for, eight of which refer to the particular vulnerability of certain countries to the 
impacts of climate change.149 It specifies that in their implementation of the 
Convention all Parties shall give ‘full consideration to what actions are necessary 
under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance, and transfer of 
technology to meet specific needs and concerns’ of such developing country parties 
arising from the adverse effects of climate change, and that the COP ‘may take 
actions, as appropriate, with respect to this paragraph.’ Through broad, Article 4.8 can 
be interpreted as including both financial and technical needs for damage prevention 
(adaptation) along with the associated costs of residual climate change damage (loss 
and damage). 
 
These provisions are not strong enough to justify a loss and damage 
mechanism themselves, but do provide a footing for discussions and negotiations. The 
COP and the UNFCCC do not define which countries are particularly vulnerable, nor 
set out criteria to establish this. Based on a variety of information, such as IPCCC 
Reports and initial national communications, the COP has instead highlighted the 
need to meet the adaptation needs of two particular groups of countries: LDCs and 
SIDS. A loss and damage mechanism would need to specify responsible parties, as 
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well as countries that are able to claim compensation in a clearer way, to ensure there 
is a robust mechanism in place.  
 
A major issue in recent debates on loss and damage under the UNFCCC has 
been the membership of the interim Executive Committee, specifically the lack of 
membership of LDCs and SIDS.150 This question is fundamental to governance of a 
loss and damage mechanism. Inclusiveness is extremely important for a loss and 
damage mechanism having political legitimacy. After the controversies of COP 15, 
legitimate representation and inclusiveness have been seen as central to creating 
binding mechanisms. In order for a loss and damage mechanism to prioritise the 
vulnerable and be truly inclusive it is important that LDCs and SIDS are not only part 
of the process, but also involved in its governance.  
5.2 Finance and Funding  
 
Financial commitments are vital to a working loss and damage mechanism. As 
discussed, the UNFCCC is embedded with notions of financial assistance from 
developed Annex I and Annex II Parties to developing non-Annex Parties, 
particularly LDCs and SIDS.  
 
The UNFCCC provides for an official financial mechanism under Article 11, 
which has entrusted the Global Environmental Facility and more recently the Green 
Climate Fund (henceforth ‘GCF’). Three other funds have been established under the 
UNFCCC: the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, 
and the Kyoto Adaptation Fund. In addition, bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
channels exist in keeping with developed country funding obligations under Article 
11.5. None of these funds specifically provide for compensation, insurance or the type 
of funding required for a loss and damage mechanism. Article 4.8 makes reference to 
the types of funding required to address loss and damage and a broad reference to all 
‘necessary’ actions. However, it does not state whether financing such action must 
come through the UNFCCC financial mechanism, leaving open whether loss and 
damage funding under Article 4.8 is through the current UNFCCC funding 
mechanisms or other channels.  
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The greatest hope in climate funding remains the ambitious GCF, where a 
funding commitment was made through the 2009 Copenhagen Accord for developed 
countries to collectively pledge “new and additional” funding of US$100 billion per 
year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries.151 Though the initial pledge 
was meant to assist mitigation and adaptation actions, the GCF itself could include 
funding for loss and damage.152 The GCF receives guidance from the COP, including 
on matters relating to policies, programmes, priorities and eligibility criteria.153 The 
GCF Board then approves such actions and can also approve thematic windows of 
substructure to address specific activities (such as for loss and damage).154  
 
The other major issue is raising climate finance itself. Climate funding overall, 
whether through the GCF or alternative streams has remained far below what is 
required. A World Bank report suggests that fundraising for mitigation and adaptation 
have been woefully inadequate, standing at less than 5 per cent of projected needs.155 
Here the role of ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ are stressed. A major deficit in current 
climate financing can be traced to the fact that most funds are voluntary. The 
UNFCCC must make financial contributions obligatory for loss and damage. There is 
a fundamental conceptual difference between giving voluntary ‘aid’ type payments 
into a fund and obligatory payments based on liability. As outlined in this paper, state 
and civil liability regimes provide examples of how to address loss and damage. The 
framework developed in this paper demands a clear delineation between 
responsibility and vulnerability, which works under a liability approach. Verheyen 
and Roderick have suggested that financial limits, such as ceilings on liability, caps 
relative to GDP, tiered financial limits, and time limits, such as limiting claims based 
on damage after a certain year, can provide compromises to parties.156 Such options 
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are in line with both the 1991 and 2008 Proposals by AOSIS; many examples are 
shown in the discussion of environmental liability schemes in section 3.  
 
One recent proposal is for a loss and damage mechanism funded by levies paid 
by major polluting companies, based on their emission to date and on future 
extraction of fossil fuels.157 Such proposals seek to fill the ‘funding gap’ around loss 
and damage through identifying large polluting companies as ‘responsible parties’ 
under the no-harm rule. The Carbon Majors Proposal also borrows the idea of a levy 
and polluter pays from the CLC, referred to in Section 4.3. The Carbon Majors 
Proposal still leave a number of considerations under an ethical and legal framework, 
such as how international legal principles of CBDRRC are dealt with (as several large 
oil polluting companies being from developing countries) and how one ensures that 
the levy is punitive or reparative (from a transitional justice point of view) rather than 
merely being subsumed as a ‘small tax’ by a corporation.  
 
Nevertheless, the Carbon Majors Proposal does present a strong starting point, 
in line with an ethical and legal framework, for State Parties to consider how to 
provide adequate finance for a loss and damage mechanism. It could also be the basis 
of a civil liability regime for global warming.  
 
5.3 Centring the moral claim  
 
The UNFCCC includes important principles based on environmental ethics and equity 
under Article 3, many of which have been referred to throughout this paper. However, 
in recent years technical and economic debates rather than the deep moral issues at 
stake have dominated the climate regime.158 The populations that face ‘life and death’ 
questions because of the impacts of climate change are often marginalised in such 
debates. Therefore, centring the moral claim of loss and damage and the principles 
articulated in Article 3 of the UNFCCC is important for an international mechanism. 
This is not to de-emphasise science or economics, but rather re-emphasis the ethical 
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principles which were written into international documents several decades ago with 
more enthusiasm.   
 
The inclusion and participation of civil society has been an important feature 
of the UNFCCC, mandated through Article 7.6 of the Convention. Since 1992, the 
COP has seen the participation of nearly one hundred thousand delegates, with over 
half from civil society representing over 1300 NGOs.159 NGOs cover a broad 
spectrum of society’s interests, including environment, sustainable development, 
business, energy, and education.160 The UNFCCC does in this regard have the 
institutional framework and experience to ensure a participative loss and damage 
mechanism as much as any international regime.  
 
However, gaps remain in the UNFCCC process. Since 1992 environmental 
NGOs, business NGOs, and research organisations have made up nearly two-thirds of 
NGO participation.161 In contrast, indigenous peoples groups and women’s groups 
participated less than other organisations, including religious organisations. In 
addition, ‘trade union NGOs’ represented less than 1 per cent of the proportion of 
participation.162 A preliminary scan of such figures indicates that further efforts must 
be made to enhance a participative approach under the UNFCCC to reach the most 
vulnerable populations, particularly with respect to a loss and damage mechanism. A 
deeper analysis of NGO and civil society participation, as well as a theoretical 
understanding from political science and more critical approaches such as subaltern 
studies and Third World Approaches to International Law, could provide a way 
forward for a participative loss and damage mechanism. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that there is both a moral and legal imperative for a loss and 
damage mechanism under the UNFCCC. A framework has been outlined based on 
these underpinnings that can be used to create a truly just and legitimate mechanism 
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to address loss and damage. This framework carefully considers both the moral and 
legal obligations, as well as the political frameworks that exist.  
 
The UNFCCC remains the focal point to a solution to loss and damage. It 
provides a global solution to a global problem with local impacts. Other movements, 
such as Palau’s possible ICJ advisory opinion request, could provide a platform for 
climate liability regime to develop in the future. But given the increasingly marginal 
timeframes, imminent action is necessary. Some may not favour the slow pace of 
UNFCCC discussions; however it provides a platform for a mechanism based on 
political consensus and has many of the frameworks already in place. Implementing a 
loss and damage mechanism will not happen within one COP. It is an on-going 
process that requires significant political will and diplomacy from all parties.  
 
Whilst this paper has concentrated on the UNFCCC, it is important to 
remember that it is not a panacea when it comes to addressing climate change or loss 
and damage. Rather, an ‘all hands on deck’ approach is necessary to tackle climate 
change. This includes radical changes to lifestyles, legal frameworks and lifestyles to 
ensure mitigation and adaptions requirements. Further, addressing loss and damage 
needs to ‘not become the norm’ of climate change negotiations, as substantial 
mitigation efforts need to occur to prevent the catastrophic consequences of further 
climate change. However, appropriately addressing this regulatory gap in the 
UNFCCC could flow on to enhance the mitigation efforts necessary.  
